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On Democracy:  representation beyond the ballot-box  
 
Simin Davoudi 
 
When is a political authority legitimate?i This is one of the fundamental questions of 
political philosophy and one that planners are often confronted with. Is a planning 
decision legitimate because those who took the decision have the consent of the voters? 
Is it because the procedure through which the decision was made was democratic?  Or, 
is it because the outcome from the decision was equitable?     
 
The consent perspective has been debated since the 17th century when John Locke 
placed it at the centre of his ‘social contract’ theory, referring to the transfer of political 
authority from ‘free and equal’ individuals to the state.  Since then, it has often been 
criticised for masquerading structures of subordination. The procedural view of 
legitimacy implies that people will accept a democratic decision even if they disagree 
with its outcome. So, if the procedure is democratic the outcome itself is deemed 
legitimate and those who disagree are obliged to go along with it. However, not 
everyone agrees that democracy (or fair procedure) is necessary for political legitimacy. 
For example, in objection to Locke’s consent theory, David Hume famously argued that 
we should look for ‘beneficial consequences’ as a source of political legitimacy.  His 
substantive view of legitimacy implies that, what makes political institutions legitimate is 
the quality of their outcomes irrespective of the procedures by which they are generated. 
If the outcomes are beneficial, the institutions are justified to rule and their rules ought 
to be obeyed. In practice, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between the quality of 
outcome and the quality of procedure and to substitute one with the other. In this 
column, however, I will limit my attention to procedural legitimacy and the question of 
representation which is at its heart.  
 
The conventional accounts of representation conceptualise it as primarily a principal-
agent relationship whereby the principals elect agents to speak and act on their behalf.  
This is the basis of all representative democracies in which the most critical relations are 
those of authorisation and accountability. Representative democracy was highly criticised 
by Jean Jacque Rousseau for giving people only a ‘brief moment of liberty’ at the election 
time after which  they return to ‘slavery’. For him, only direct self-government could be 
considered as democratic and politically legitimate. Contemporary deliberative democrats 
consider representative democracy as an incomplete form of procedural legitimacy 
because it confines the political role of citizens to periodic voting at elections plus some 
forms of intermittent practices when their particular interests are at stake. Opposition to 
unwanted planning proposals is a good example of such intermittent political practices.  
It is argued that in representative democracies people become passive observers who 
have periodic capacity to vote and select but, with no permanent voice over collective 
decisions that affect them. One of the most influential advocates of deliberative 
democracy is Jorgen Habermas whose influence on communicative and collaborative 
planning theories is well documented, as is the critiques of his ‘ideal speech theory’. 
However, what is less known is his contribution to the conceptualisation of democracy 
which goes beyond the representation - participation binary and considers the latter as a 
complement to the former.  As David Plotke (a democratic theorist) reminds us 
representation is not an unfortunate compromise between an ideal of direct democracy 
(suggested by Rousseau and pursued by deliberative democrats) and the messy realities 
of modern politics. It is indeed crucial in constituting democratic practices.  
 
But, is representation limited to the conventional, formalistic representation that is 
defined by periodic election at the ballot box? The answer is no because, firstly, in the 
current political realities international, local and non-governmental actors (who are not 
necessarily elected by their constituents) play an increasingly significant role in polity. 
Secondly, contemporary associational life that is manifested in interest groups, civic 
associations and action groups are crucial for the survival of democracy. In today’s 
complex and broadly democratic societies, representation is the subject of competing 
claims. Given the fluidity of the relationship between represented and representative, it 
is naïve to think about democratic representation as a monolithic concept based on 
formal relations of authorisation and accountability.  
 
In order to understand the meaning of representation we need to know the context in 
which representation is situated. It was this recognition that grounded Hanna Pitkin’s 
pioneering and highly influential paper written almost fifty years ago. She argued that in 
addition to the conventional, formalistic representation, there are at least three other 
ways in which the concept of representation is invoked. These are: substantive, 
symbolic, and descriptive representations.  Substantive representation refers to the 
outcome and action of representatives and the extent to which they serve the interests 
and preferences of the represented. Symbolic representation relates to the meaning that 
representatives have for the represented and the extent to which they are accepted by 
them. Descriptive representation is about how far the representatives resemble those 
being represented by sharing common interests, identities, and experiences with them. 
These are summarised in the table below. 
 
 
  
Forms of representation  Strategic question 
Formalistic Do they speak for the represented? 
Symbolic Do they stand for the represented? 
Descriptive Do they resemble the represented? 
Substantive Do they act for represented? 
 
There is not enough space here to further elaborate these multiple forms of 
representation and their potential rewards and pitfalls.  Suffice to say that they show the 
difficulty of drawing a line between procedural and substantive legitimacy, formal and 
informal representation, and representation and participation. They act as a reminder of 
David Miller’s suggestion that, democracy is not an-all-or-nothing matter but, a 
continuous struggle to give people as a whole the final authority over the government’s 
affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                          
i
 This column draws on a joint paper with my colleague, Paul Cowie, for the ACSP-AESOP joint conference in  
July 2013 in Dublin.       
